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Humans involved in cooperative interactions
willingly pay a cost to punish cheats. However,
the proximate motives underpinning punitive be-
haviour are currently debated. Individuals who
interact with cheats experience losses, but they
also experience lower payoffs than the cheating
partner. Thus, the negative emotions that trigger
punishment may stem from a desire to recipro-
cate losses or from inequity aversion. Previous
studies have not disentangled these possibilities.
Here, we use an experimental approach to ask
whether punishment is motivated by inequity
aversion or by a desire for reciprocity. We show
that humans punish cheats only when cheating
produces disadvantageous inequity, while there
is no evidence for reciprocity. This ﬁnding chal-
lenges the notion that punishment is motivated
by a simple desire to reciprocally harm cheats
and shows that victims compare their own
payoffs with those of partners when making
punishment decisions.
Keywords: punishment; inequity aversion;
reciprocity
1. INTRODUCTION
Punishment is a costly behaviour that is often aimed at
individuals who cheat during social interactions.
Although punishers make an initial investment to harm
cheats, the investment may be repaid if the cheat behaves
more cooperatively in future interactions [1,2]. Identify-
ing the motives underpinning human punishment is
crucialaspunishmentplaysanimportantroleinthemain-
tenance of cooperation in human societies [3]. Several
recentstudieshaveshown thatplayersexperience negative
emotions, such as anger or disgust, when they interact
withcheatsandthattheintensityoftheseemotionsisposi-
tively associated with the desire to reciprocally harm
cheatingpartners[4–6].Theactofadministeringpunish-
ment provides relief from negative emotions as it activates
reward centres in the brain [7]. In this way, punishment
can be subjectively rewarding. Although negative
emotions motivate punishment, it is not yet clear why
these emotions are produced during interactions with
cheats. One possibility is that negative emotions are
caused by disadvantageous inequity aversion (hereafter
‘inequity aversion’), or the disutility associated with
experiencing lower payoffs than a cheating partner [8].
However, a simpler alternative is that victims of cheats
experience negative emotions because cheats violate
cooperative norms, thereby imposing losses on coopera-
tive partners [4]. Thus, in some contexts, punishment
may be motivated by the desire to reciprocally harm
cheating partners, even if the cheating partner did not
experience higher payoffs than the victim. Thus, experi-
encing losses without simultaneously experiencing
unequal payoffs may sufﬁce to motivate punishment,
although this possibility has not been tested.
The concepts of inequity aversion and of reciprocity
both predict that punishment decisions will be inﬂu-
enced by the partner’s behaviour. However, inequity
aversion predicts that individuals are sensitive to how
their payoffs compare with those of interaction partners,
whereas the concept of reciprocity predicts that punish-
ment decisions are inﬂuenced by how payoffs compare
with individual expectations and are therefore indepen-
dent of the relative payoffs gained by cheating partners.
It is hard to disentangle whether punishment is motiv-
ated by a desire to reciprocate losses or by inequity
aversion because players involved in interactions with
cheats often simultaneously experience losses and
inequity [9,10]. For example, evidence from laboratory
public goods games (where contributions to a communal
account are altruistic in the sense that they yield beneﬁts
to other group members at a cost to the donor; [11]) has
shown that players experience anger and disgust when
interacting with non-contributing (‘free-riding’) group
members. The intensity of these emotions correlates
with the propensity to administer costly punishment to
reduce free-riders’ incomes [4,12]. However, in such
games, cooperative individuals (those who contribute
to the communal account) experience absolute losses
and lower payoffs relative to those of free-riders, mean-
ing that it is not clear whether the negative emotions
produced from interactions with cheats arise from a
desire to reciprocate losses or from inequity aversion
[10]. A more recent study used a random income
game (where players were randomly allocated differ-
ent-sized earnings) to show that punitive behaviour
can be motivated by inequity, even in the absence of
losses [12]. Low-earning players in this game experi-
enced negative emotions targeted towards higher-
earning counterparts and were willing to pay a cost to
reduce the income of high earners [12]. Thus, punitive
behaviour can arise even when higher-earning players
do not impose losses on lower-earning individuals and
when there is no cooperative norm to be enforced. In a
subsequent study, it was shown that the tendency to
reduce the income of high earners in a random income
game is positively associated with the propensity to
punish free-riders in public goods games [13]. While
these ﬁndings indicate that punishment may be motiv-
ated by inequity aversion, neither study asked whether
punishment might also be motivated by losses in the
absence of inequity. We tested this possibility here.
We designed an experiment based on a simpliﬁed ver-
sion of the moonlighting game [14] to determine whether
human punishment is motivated bya desire to reciprocate
losses or by inequity aversion. Subjects were assigned to
one of two roles, player 1 (P1) or player 2 (P2), and
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ments (A–C). In treatment A, P1 was given $0.70 and
P2 was given $0.10. In treatment B, P1 was given $0.70
and P2 was given $0.30. In treatment C, P1 was given
$0.70 and P2 was given $0.70. The game consisted of
two stages: in the ﬁrst stage, P2 could choose to ‘cheat’
by taking $0.20 of P1’s endowment and in the second
stage P1 could choose to punish P2 (pay $0.10 to
reduce P2’s income by $0.30). In treatment A, P1 main-
tained a higher payoff than P2 when P2 cheated ($0.50
versus $0.30). In treatment B, cheating by P2 produced
equal outcomes ($0.50 each). In treatment C, cheating
by P2 meant that P1 got $0.50 while P2 got $0.90.
T h u s ,P 1e x p e r i e n c e dt h es a m el o s s e si na l lt h r e et r e a t -
ments and always ﬁnished with a payoff of $0.50 if P2
cheated. Crucially, however, only in treatment C did
cheating by P2 result in P1 experiencing lower payoffs
than P2 (disadvantageous inequity). This setup therefore
allowed us to disentangle the effect of experiencing losses
from the effect of experiencing inequity as motivators
for punishment.
2. MATERIAL AND METHODS
We recruited subjects for our experiment using the online labour
market, Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT; www.mturk.com). AMT
connects ‘requesters’ (or experimenters) with ‘workers’ (or subjects),
the latter being incentivized to perform short tasks for small pay-
ments [15]. Previous studies have validated this approach by
replicating ﬁndings from economic games performed under labora-
tory conditions [16–18], even with small stakes that are commonly
used in the AMT framework [19].
We recruited 560 subjects (361 males, 195 females, four unspeci-
ﬁed) to take part in our experiment. Subjects varied in age from 16 to
69 (mean ¼ 29+0.4) years old. Of the 560 subjects, 280 (175 males,
101 females, four unspeciﬁed) were allocated the role of P1 and
assigned to one of six independent treatments (see the electronic sup-
plementary material, tables S1 and S2). The remaining 280 subjects
were assigned the role P2 and were assigned to one of three treatments
(see the electronic supplementary material, table S2). Each subject
was allocated to one role and one treatment only. We used ex-post
matching [18] to pair players with their respective partners. All sub-
jects were paid a show-up fee of $0.20 and were required to answer
four comprehension questions correctly to take part in the experiment.
Eligible subjects were redirected to an external survey website
(https://opinio.ucl.ac.uk) where they were assigned to their role (P1
or P2) and treatment. Subjects played anonymously because they
interact via a unique, 14-digit worker ID and were told that their
worker ID would not be revealed to other players in the game. Workers
were prevented from participating repeatedly in the experiment by
allowing only one entry per unique ID (worker ID must be linked
to a valid credit card, which largely prevents workers from accruing
multiple accounts; [16]) and by preventing repeated access to the
external survey website from the same IP address.
3. RESULTS
The mean proportion of P1 who decided to punish P2
was 24.4+0 per cent when P2 cheated and 11.7+0
per cent when P2 did not cheat. In treatments A and
B, P1’s decision to punish P2 was not affected by
whether P2 cheated (ﬁgure 1). Thus, incurring losses
in the absence of inequity did not motivate P1
to punish P2. Conversely, experiencing losses that
also produced inequity (treatment C) motivated P1
to punish P2 (x
2 ¼ 10, p ¼ 0.007, ﬁgure 1).
4. DISCUSSION
In this experiment, the loss experienced by P1 as a
result of P2 cheating was the same ($0.20) across all
treatments but P1 only punished P2 when P2 cheating
resulted in P1 experiencing lower relative payoffs.
Together, these results suggest that disadvantageous
inequity is the driving force motivating punishment,
implying that the proximate motives underpinning
human punishment might therefore stem from
inequity aversion rather than the desire to reciprocate
losses. Although evidence for punishment in non-
human animals is rare [2], in species where it does
occur it is thought to be motivated by experiencing
losses rather than inequity [10]. In part, this may be
because monitoring their own payoffs relative to an
internal reference point is less cognitively demanding
than also monitoring—and comparing—the payoffs
that accrue to an interaction partner.
Why do humans rely on a more cognitively complex
task of monitoring their own payoffs relative to those of
interaction partners, rather than simply monitoring
their own payoffs relative to an internal expectation,
when deciding whether to punish cheats? One
possibility is that punishment promotes cooperative be-
haviour only if the punishment is deemed to be fair.
This may only be the case when a cheat gains higher
payoffs from the interaction than the victim as a conse-
quence of the cheating behaviour. Victims of cheats may
therefore do best to monitor how their payoffs compare
with those of interaction partners before investing in
costly punishment. Empirical evidence offers some sup-
port for this hypothesis. Using an experimental trust
game with and without punishment, Fehr & Rocken-
bach [20] showed that the moral legitimacy of
punishment has a striking effect on the prevalence of
cooperative behaviour. In this game, one individual,
an ‘investor’, can send money to another individual, a
‘trustee’. The money sent to the trustee is multiplied
by the experimenter and the trustee can then choose
how much of the entrusted amount to return to the
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Figure 1. The proportion of P1 individuals who punished P2
according to treatment (A–C) and whether P2 cheated (by
taking $0.20 of P1’s endowment). Initial endowments (P1:
P2, $) in treatment A were 0.70: 0.10; in treatment B were
0.70 : 0.30 and in treatment C were 0.70 : 0.70. Sample
sizes for each condition are indicated in parentheses. Dark
grey bars, no cheating; light grey bars, P2 cheated.
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Biol. Lett. (2012)investor. In their study [20], investors were allowed to
stipulate how much of their initial investment they
expected to receive back from the trustee and also
whether they would ﬁne the trustee for non-compli-
ance. They found that ﬁnes for desired back-transfers
that were deemed to be unfair largely undermined
cooperative behaviour: trustees kept more of the
invested amount under these conditions. This study
suggests that punitive behaviour that is deemed to be
unfair may not be accepted by the target. As well as fail-
ing to promote cooperative behaviour, punishment may
also elicit retaliation from targets (cf. [21]), although it
is not known whether retaliation is more likely when
punishment is deemed to be unfair. This would be an
interesting avenue for future investigation.
To sum up, our experiment demonstrates that
humans are sensitive to inequity but not to losses
when deciding whether to punish a cheating partner.
Elucidating the motives that trigger punishment of
cheats may yield insights into the ultimate function of
punitive behaviour in humans: speciﬁcally, it may be
the case that punishment is aimed at promoting fair be-
haviour rather than simply deterring partners from
cheating. Such insights may tell us much about the con-
textswherepunishmentismostlikelytobeimplemented
and also where it is likely to be most effective.
This study was funded by a Royal Society University
Research Fellowship to N.R. Thanks to Redouan Bshary
and Dave Rand for useful comments and discussion.
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